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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a man traveling abroad.  He drives his car to a foreign country.  
He arrives at a border checkpoint and stops.  He hands over the relevant 
paperwork, and the border guard steps away to verify it.  The guard suspects 
that the driver has handed him a forged car insurance certificate.  He 
questions the driver and, satisfied with his answers and explanations, lets him 
go without incident.  The man drives off, perhaps a bit miffed at the entire 
incident, and later returns to his home country. 
Fast forward several months.  The man is at home when officers arrive at 
his doorstep with a warrant for his arrest for allegedly using forged insurance 
documents.  He has not returned to the foreign country at any point; no 
foreign police officers have crossed international borders to remove him 
from his home country, and no diplomatic wrangling has resulted in his 
arrest.  Despite this, he is held in prison in his home country for weeks.  
Finally he is sent, he thinks, to stand trial in the country where his alleged 
offense took place.  When he arrives there, the matter is settled, perhaps 
anticlimactically, with the payment of an administrative penalty, and he 
receives no criminal record as a result. 
This is the story of a British citizen extradited to Poland under Polish 
arrest orders through a European Arrest Warrant (EAW).1  This story is not 
unique; troubling instances of similar arrests under the EAW system 
abound.2  The EAW system has “abolish[ed] extradition between Member 
States and replac[ed] it by a system of surrender between judicial 
authorities”3 where Member States must respect and execute each other’s 
arrest decisions on the basis of mutual recognition.4  To some extent, the 
                                                                                                                   
 1 Andrew Gilligan, Surge in Britons Exported for Trial, TELEGRAPH (Aug. 21, 2010), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/7958202/Surge-in-Britons-exported-for-trial.html. 
 2 See Andrew Gilligan, Arrested and Held in Britain on Demand of EU Prosecutors, 
TELEGRAPH (Aug. 21, 2010), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/795820 
8/Arrested-and-held-in-Britain-on-demand-of-EU-prosecutors.html (detailing several other 
arrests under the EAW, including that of two English men extradited to Hungary on 
accusations of owing creditors £18,000; the men spent three months in jail before even being 
interviewed by Hungarian police and who were freed after five months in prison without ever 
being charged with a crime); see also Richard Edwards & Jackie Williams, I Sold Junk. Now I 
Face Four Years in Greek Jail, Says Antiques Dealer, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Aug. 28, 
2010, at 17 (relating the story of a UK citizen whose alleged offense occurred in Britain, yet 
was extradited to Greece under the EAW).  
 3 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European Arrest 
Warrant and the Surrender Procedures Between Member States, 2002 O.J. (L 190) 1 (EC) 
[hereinafter Council Framework Decision]. 
 4 Id. art. 1, para. 2.  
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practical result of the EAW system has been the so-called “Europeanization 
of penal law,”5 as the criminal laws of states requesting EAWs are now able 
to reach beyond national borders and compel action by police officers and 
judges in other Member States.6  
This extradition mechanism has been used at an increasing rate against 
UK citizens since its implementation in 2004.7  For example, the number of 
Britons detained and extradited under the EAW during the period from April 
2009 to April 2010 was over 50% higher than the number extradited in 
2008–2009.8  A 70% increase is expected for 2011.9  The increase is partially 
driven by the UK’s participation in a new EU-wide database that will help 
fast-track extradition with greater access to information about defendants.10  
The British Home Office estimates that the increase in extradition requests 
will lead to three times more extradition arrests and will cost an additional 
£17,000,000 even before police and court costs are considered.11 
This increase in arrests and extraditions may not be troubling in and of 
itself.  The conventional wisdom of the incapacitation theory of criminal law 
suggests that more arrests mean more criminals behind bars, more criminals 
behind bars mean fewer criminals running free in society, and fewer free 
criminals means fewer criminals able to commit future crimes against 
innocent members of society.12  What is troubling is that more and more 
                                                                                                                   
 5 Helmut Satzger & Tobias Pohl, The German Constitutional Court and the European 
Arrest Warrant: ‘Cryptic Signals’ from Karlsruhe, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 686, 687 (2006). 
 6 See Dorota Leczykiewicz, Constitutional Conflicts and the Third Pillar, 33 EUR. L. REV. 
230, 231 (2008) (“[T]he answer to the question of whether the EAW mechanism can be used 
in a given case depends on how the offences are defined in the criminal law of the issuing 
Member State.”).  
 7 See Gilligan, supra note 2 (indicating that twenty-four people were extradited from 
Britain under the EAW scheme in 2004 while 1,032 were extradited in the year preceding 
April 2010); see also Gilligan, supra note 1 (noting that this jump was a forty-three-fold 
increase in the use of EAWs against UK citizens).   
 8 Gilligan, supra note 1.  But see Christopher Booker, Deportations Under EU Warrants 
Likely to Treble, TELEGRAPH (Aug. 22, 2009), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/columnists/ 
christopherbooker/6073950/Deportations-under-EU-warrants-likely-to-treble.html (noting the 
British Home Office expected the number of extraditions under EAW’s to triple from 500 to as 
many as 1,700 each year). 
 9 Gilligan, supra note 1. 
 10 Extraditions to Poland: Wanted, for Chicken Rustling, ECONOMIST, Jan. 2, 2010, at 42. 
 11 Id. 
 12 JAMES Q. WILSON, Selective Incapacitation, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING 148 (Andrew von 
Hirsch & Andrew Ashworth eds., 1992) (“When criminals are deprived of their liberty, as by 
imprisonment . . . , their ability to commit offenses against citizens is ended.  We say these 
persons have been ‘incapacitated’ . . . .”); James Q. Wilson, Dealing with the High-Rate 
Offender, 72 PUB. INT. 52, 52 (1983). 
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people, who may not be criminals, are being incapacitated because officials 
are abusing EAW power, especially in Poland.13  Statistics indicate that 
Poland is the most frequent seeker of EAWs against British citizens.14  The 
Polish insistence on extraditing citizens of the UK led British officials to 
send a delegation to Poland in 2008 to ask for fewer EAW requests.15  It also 
led to a November 2009 meeting of EU members in Brussels, the meeting’s 
aim was to reach a compromise on the EAW issue between the two nations.16  
Both efforts ultimately failed and British police resources that could be used 
for other endeavors remain dedicated to carrying out these requests.17 
Some commentators have explained overuse or disproportionate use of 
the EAW by blaming the lack of an inter-European method for guaranteeing 
a defendant’s presence for trial in a foreign country.18  Others have pointed to 
certain nations that, like Poland, have criminal systems mandating 
compulsory prosecution of crimes no matter how insignificant.19  
                                                                                                                   
 13 See Gilligan, supra note 2 (indicating that Poland extradites so many individuals from the  
UK that “[t]he Polish accused even have their own low-cost airline – they are dispatched, en 
masse, by special fortnightly military flights”); see also Gilligan, supra note 1 (explaining that 
the UK uses the EAW to a far lesser extent, as “98 people were brought to the UK on European 
Arrest Warrants in 12 months, a fall of 6 per cent on the year before”); Andrew Gilligan, Britain 
Left to Count Cost of European Arrest Warrant, TELEGRAPH (Aug. 28, 2010), http://www.telegr 
aph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/7969981/Britain-left-to-count-cost-of-European-Arrest- 
Warrant.html (supporting the notion that the UK uses the EAW to bring foreigners to trial in 
Britain far less than other nations by citing EU figures that show 44% of prisoners in Greek jails 
are foreigners while only 14% of prisoners in British jails are foreigners).  
 14 Gilligan, supra note 2 (noting that “[b]etween a third and a half of all EAW requests to 
the UK come from Poland”).  But see Extraditions to Poland: Wanted, for Chicken Rustling, 
supra note 10 (indicating that Poland accounts for over half of Britain’s extraditions, and that 
the number of extraditions to Poland “grew from four in 2005 to 186 in the first nine months 
of 2008,” which is ten times the number of extraditions to Ireland, “despite the fact that Irish 
migrants . . . outnumber Poles in Britain”). 
 15 Extraditions to Poland: Wanted, for Chicken Rustling, supra note 10. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. (indicating that “[f]ugitives are tracked down by the Serious Organised Crime 
Agency, an outfit designed to bust international crime syndicates” and that some have 
criticized Poland for using “more discretion at home, where its own resources are at stake”).  
 18 Joachim Vogel & J.R. Spencer, Proportionality and the European Arrest Warrant, 6 
CRIM. L. REV. 474, 479–80 (2010) (noting that EU Member States “have long noticed that a 
considerable number of European arrest warrants relate to petty offences” and that the major 
purpose of these “warrants seems to be to enforce the wanted person’s presence in the issuing 
Member State’s trial courts, in particular where the issuing Member State’s law does not 
provide for in absentia proceedings,” but also arguing that although “[p]olitically speaking, it 
might seem regrettable that there is, for the time being, no proper ‘European summons’ . . . the 
gap must not be filled by simply issuing European arrest warrants”).  
 19 Rosemary Davidson, A Sledgehammer to Crack a Nut? Should There Be a Bar of 
Triviality in European Arrest Warrant Cases?, 1 CRIM. L. REV. 31, 34 (2009).  
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Compulsory prosecution requires that “where there is evidence of a crime it 
must be investigated and prosecuted, if necessary by the issue of an EAW.”20 
The European extradition practice includes jailing suspects for the 
commissions of crimes that are not crimes in their home states without 
consulting culpable evidence.21  Once extradition takes place, a suspect’s 
rights vary across the EU; there is no guarantee that a UK citizen will be 
treated abroad as he would be in a UK prison or be afforded the same 
protections as if he were a defendant in a British proceeding.22  
This Note posits that there must be a balance struck between the 
theoretical benefits of participating in the EU extradition process and the 
practical concerns for protecting citizens from potential abuse of this system.  
Proponents have stated that EAW procedures would promote the 
effectiveness of European cooperation on “criminal matters, such as those 
concerning attacks on information systems, organized crime and terrorism.”23  
This Note argues that EAW legislation in the UK should reflect the notion 
that “[e]xpedition and rights protection should not be mutually exclusive.”24  
Ideally, increased rights protection will not only curb the sheer number of 
EAWs executed by European nations against British citizens and save British 
resources.  More importantly, this will also make the EAWs actually carried 
out comport with basic notions of fairness for criminal suspects. 
Although the EAW system has EU-wide reach and implications, the focus 
of this Note is the use of the EAW in practice in the UK.  It proposes a 
solution to the problems that have arisen in that country, namely the 
introduction of U.S.-style “due process” for to be considered by UK judges 
as they decide whether to surrender UK citizens to other nations under the 
EAW system.  This procedure is intended to protect UK citizens from those 
abuses that they have endured in the six years since the EAW system has 
been in place.   
                                                                                                                   
 20 Id.  
 21 See Gilligan, supra note 1 (noting that one British man fighting extradition to Romania 
for possession of cannabis was in his third month in a British prison and was likely to spend at 
least two more months in prison before his appeal was even heard).   
 22 Michael Plachta, Towards Miranda Warning Across European Union?, 26 INT’L 
ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 394, 394 (2010) (explaining that “[s]tandards of justice vary greatly 
from one EU country to another and fundamental rights do not receive the same respect in 
every Member State” and that “[d]efense rights have been sidelined, not strengthened, in the 
name of closer cooperation”).  
 23 William Sanchez, Legislative Development: Council Framework Decision of 13 June 
2002 on the European Arrest Warrant and the Surrender Procedures Between Member States, 
9 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 195, 197 (2002). 
 24 Eoin Carolan, Reciprocity and Rights Under the European Arrest Warrant Regime, 123 
LAW Q. REV. 197, 202 (2007). 
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Part II of this Note describes the pre-EAW European extradition regime 
as well as the origins of the EAW.  Specifically, this Note describes in detail 
the UK’s extradition regime in existence prior to the Council Framework 
Decision.  It explains the EAW extradition process as it was intended to be 
carried out under the Council Framework Decision.  It also describes some of 
the practical problems with its implementation. 
Part III documents the constitutional and legal challenges, levied against 
the EAW by various EU Member States, that have resulted from the lack of 
protection offered to citizens being extradited throughout the EU.  It also 
describes the current state of the EAW in the UK and details the 
shortcomings in UK law with regard to protecting the fundamental rights of 
British citizens arrested under the EAW. 
Part IV explains the valuable lesson to be learned from the state of the 
law in the EU and UK: there is a place for carve-outs from the EU 
framework that offer protection for citizens before they are extradited.  
Finally, this Note proposes a solution to excessive use of EAWs against UK 
citizens that relies on American ideas of due process to correct the most 
pressing and glaring weaknesses in the EAW scheme. 
II.  BACKGROUND  
A.  The Extradition Process Before the Council Framework Decision 
A system of cooperation between Member States governed extradition in 
the EU before the 2002 Council Framework Decision was passed.25  The 
system was governed by the European Extradition Convention,26 originally 
signed in 1957 and modified through two additional protocols and one 
further convention on the suppression of terrorism.27  Ultimately, the 
Convention set up a political process rather than a judicial process, as 
extradition requests between Member States were to be “in writing 
and . . . communicated through the diplomatic channel.”28  The Convention 
did allow police forces in the Member State where the person sought was 
located to conduct an arrest, but this was a limited “provisional arrest” power 
that could be relied upon only “[i]n case of urgency.”29  Furthermore, the 
                                                                                                                   
 25 Sanchez, supra note 23, at 195. 
 26 European Convention on Extradition, opened for signature Dec. 13, 1957, 359 U.N.T.S. 
273.  
 27 Sanchez, supra note 23, at 195. 
 28 European Convention on Extradition, supra note 26, art. 12, para. 1. 
 29 Id. art. 16, para. 1. 
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“requested party”—the Member State in which the sought person was 
located—was ultimately still in control, because its competent authorities 
made the decision to arrest the sought person “in accordance with its law.”30  
The Extradition Convention thus maintained a degree of respect for both 
state sovereignty and the rights defendants were guaranteed under the laws of 
their home countries.31 
The Extradition Convention system began coming apart with the Treaty 
of Amsterdam, under which the Member States of the EU resolved “to 
facilitate the free movement of persons, while ensuring the safety and 
security of their peoples, by establishing an area of freedom, security and 
justice.”32  The European Council stepped even closer to the current EAW 
framework during its 1999 meeting in Tampere.  At Tampere, the Council 
“called for the development of a ‘genuine European area of justice’ and for a 
‘unionwide fight against crime.’ ”33  It recommended that the system of 
formal extradition procedures between Member States be abolished and 
replaced with a system of mutual recognition.34   
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States added 
further momentum toward the acceptance of the EAW framework and the 
Tampere recommendations.35  Those recommendations became a reality with 
                                                                                                                   
 30 Id. 
 31 Mark Mackarel, ‘Surrendering’ the Fugitive—The European Arrest Warrant and the 
United Kingdom, 71 J. CRIM. L. 362, 365–66 (2007) (“The traditional values of extradition as 
set down in the European Convention on Extradition 1957 are concerned with facilitating 
extradition whilst protecting state sovereignty and the rights of the individual.  The standards 
and procedures set down under the EAW are overwhelmingly concerned with the quick and 
efficient facilitation of rendition with the basic protections for the individual left to the trial 
process in the Member State.”). 
 32 Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing 
the European Communities and Certain Related Acts art. 1, para. 3, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 
340) 1; see also Sanchez, supra note 23, at 195 (stating that “[t]he Treaty of Amsterdam 
paved the way for a radically different approach to extradition within the Union when it listed 
the creation of an area of freedom, security and justice among its objectives”).  
 33 Sanchez, supra note 23, at 195–96 (quoting Presidency Conclusions, Tampere European 
Council (Oct. 16, 1999), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ef2d2264.html). 
 34 Id. at 196. 
 35 Id. (“The movement toward the creation of a European arrest warrant gained fresh 
momentum following the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, as the 
European Council, at its extraordinary meeting of September 21, 2001, agreed to the 
introduction of a ‘European warrant for arrest and extradition in accordance with the Tampere 
conclusions, and the mutual recognition of legal decisions and verdicts.’ ”); see also Oreste 
Pollicino, European Arrest Warrant and Constitutional Principles of the Member States: A 
Case Law-Based Outline in the Attempt to Strike the Right Balance Between Interacting Legal 
Systems, 9 GERMAN L.J. 1313, 1318–19 (2008) (arguing that “to a much greater extent after 
9/11, a new awareness has emerged in terms of EU security” and that “only a few months 
 
788  GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 40:781 
 
 
the 2002 Council Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant and 
Surrender Procedures Between Member States.36 
B. Relevant EAW Measures Under the 2002 Council Framework Decision  
The Council Framework Decision explains how the EAW system is 
intended to function.  It defines the EAW as a “judicial decision issued by a 
Member State with a view to the arrest and surrender by another Member 
State of a requested person, for the purposes of conducting a criminal 
prosecution or executing a custodial sentence or detention order.”37  It 
requires Member States to “execute any European arrest warrant on the basis 
of the principle of mutual recognition and in accordance with the provisions 
of this Framework Decision.”38  Thus, under the EAW, extradition is 
intended to become an “exclusively judicial issue, unlike the previous regime 
where extradition has been either entirely prohibited or a matter for national 
executives to decide.”39  Simply put, in the new EU Framework Decision 
extradition regime, there are no longer any political filters and trial judges 
make extradition decisions rather than government ministers.40 
Member States can seek EAWs for a wide range of crimes.41  Most 
notable and most problematic about this arrangement is a provision that 
requires extradition for certain listed crimes “without verification of the 
                                                                                                                   
after the attacks, and in light of the fact that it had been years since the EU produced any 
legislative response to the European diplomacy declarations, the European Council speedily 
adopted, pursuant to article 34 EU and following a rather limited debate among national 
Parliaments and within the European one, the Framework Decision on the Arrest Warrant and 
surrender procedures between Member States, with the explicit intent to replace all existent 
extradition-related instruments within the European judicial area”).  
 36 Council Framework Decision, supra note 3.  
 37 Id. art. 1, para. 1. 
 38 Id. art. 1, para. 2. 
 39 Carl Lebeck, National Constitutionalism, Openness to International Law and the 
Pragmatic Limits of European Integration – European Law in the German Constitutional 
Court from EEC to the PJCC, 7 GERMAN L.J. 907, 925 (2006).  
 40 Vogel & Spencer, supra note 18, at 481 (indicating that before the EAW, the final stage 
of the extradition process was the approval of the UK Home Secretary “who could refuse if he 
thought that extradition would be disproportionate, or otherwise oppressive,” but under the 
EAW extradition regime, “if a Member State issues an EAW to recover a suspected shoplifter, 
the courts in the requested state are bound to execute it”). 
 41 See Council Framework Decision, supra note 3, art. 2, paras. 1–2 (explaining the scope 
of the EAW and listing a number of crimes for which Member States can seek an EAW, 
including things as vague as “racism and xenophobia” and as concrete as “kidnapping, illegal 
restraint and hostage-taking”).  
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double criminality.”42  While a number of the crimes listed in this provision 
are ones recognized by all judicial systems43 (i.e., where double criminality 
already exists), others are not crimes within certain Member States or are 
rarely prosecuted there.44   
There are safeguards in place regarding extraditions, since the executing 
Member State can or must, depending on the circumstances, refuse 
extradition under an EAW.  This happens, for example, where amnesty exists 
for the crime alleged,45 where the sought person has already served a 
sentence for his crime,46 where the person sought cannot be held responsible 
because of age,47 and where the person sought is already being prosecuted by 
the state asked to execute the EAW.48 
However, the Framework Decision does not, by its terms, allow a state to 
refuse extradition because of the shortcomings of the legal system to which 
its citizen is being sent.49  While “the purpose of the EAW has been to 
judicialise the process of extradition thereby injecting certain procedural 
rights into it, it has also eradicated the scrutiny of the legal systems of States 
making requests for extraditions.”50  
The Framework Decision puts into place some safeguards on the arrest 
process itself as well as the judicial process post-arrest.  For instance, the 
judicial authority of the executing state must inform the arrested person of 
the EAW and its contents in accordance with the state’s law and the 
possibility of surrendering to the country that issued the EAW.51  The 
arrestee also has the “right to be assisted by a legal counsel and by an 
                                                                                                                   
 42 Id. art. 2, para. 2.  
 43 See id. (listing crimes such as rape, arson, trafficking in stolen vehicles, and murder, 
which are prosecuted by all judicial systems). 
 44 See, e.g., Edwards & Williams, supra note 2, at 17 (relating the story of Malcolm Hay, a 
UK citizen who sold broken pottery pieces to an art dealer from Athens, Greece in 1999 and 
was arrested by UK police eight years later under an EAW issued by Greece alleging that the 
items he sold were owned by the Greek state and thus constituted the crime of “illicit 
appropriation of an antique object,” which is not an offense under British law).  
 45 Council Framework Decision, supra note 3, art. 3, para. 1. 
 46 Id. art. 3, para. 2. 
 47 Id. art. 3, para. 3. 
 48 Id. art. 4, para. 2. 
 49 Lebeck, supra note 39, at 925–26 (“[I]t is not possible for a State to refuse extradition on 
the basis that a legal system does not fulfill the standards of art. 6 ECHR” which is the 
provision of the European Convention of Human Rights that guarantees certain minimum 
protections for criminal defendants.  “Nor is it necessary that a State requesting extradition 
does not fulfill constitutional standards of the extraditing State.”). 
 50 Id. at 926. 
 51 Council Framework Decision, supra note 3, art. 11, para. 1.  
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interpreter in accordance with the national law of the executing Member 
State.”52   
There are significant gaps in the application of these important 
safeguards.  For instance, both of these rights are defined by the law of the 
executing country, rather than by a uniform standard.  Currently, no uniform 
standard for translation facilities and services exists.  This is problematic 
because the legal systems of EU Member States vary in the amount of 
protection they offer for defendants’ rights and because the EU facilitates 
cross-border travel among countries where many different languages are 
spoken.53   
EU legislators have attempted to remedy this problem, having opened up 
talks on a draft directive that “aims to set common minimum standards on 
the right to interpretation and translation in criminal cases throughout the 
EU[ ] . . . [that] will improve the rights of suspects who do not understand or 
speak the language of the proceedings.”54  These protections would apply to 
all criminal proceedings until the conclusion of a defendant’s case—pre-trial, 
sentencing, detention, and appeal—in all cases, including those under the 
EAW.55  The directive would cover all relevant materials, including 
indictment and documentary evidence, and require translators to be 
accredited through a program of training and qualification.56  
This effort to boost protection offered during EAW proceedings is one of 
several ideas proposed to make criminal proceedings fairer and more 
convenient for defendants.  For instance, to alleviate the consequences of the 
EAW’s overuse as a means to guarantee a defendant’s physical presence in a 
Member State’s courts, some commentators have proposed the use of video 
or telephone technology.57  Others have proposed a “bar of triviality” that 
would prevent a nation from seeking an EAW for minor offenses, like thefts 
of items worth less than £50.58  Others have proposed more serious reforms, 
                                                                                                                   
 52 Id. art. 11, para. 2.  
 53 See Booker, supra note 8 (recounting the story of Garry Mann, a UK citizen traveling 
abroad in Portugal for a soccer game who was arrested by Portuguese officials, and was not 
offered any translation services).  
 54 Press Release, Comm. on Civil Liberties, Justice & Home Affairs, Stronger Language 
Rights for EU Citizens in Criminal Trials (Apr. 8, 2010), available at http://www.europarl.eu 
ropa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?language=en&type=IM-PRESS&reference=20100406IPR72182.   
 55 Id.   
 56 Id. 
 57 Vogel & Spencer, supra note 18, at 482. 
 58 See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 19, at 31, 33–34 (relating comments by British judges in 
a recent EAW case involving the offense of receiving a stolen mobile phone suggesting that 
EAWs should not be used for such trivial cases, but ultimately rejecting such a bar of triviality 
because it would allow the defendant to escape the consequences of his actions and would 
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like a Miranda-style warning across the EU that would inform the defendant 
of the crime of which he was suspected and give him the right to the 
assistance of an attorney, to an interpreter, and to know the length of his 
detention.59 
C.  Extradition in the UK Before and After the 2002 Council Framework 
Decision 
UK extradition laws before the Framework Decision placed substantial 
control of the process in British hands.60  A system of “dual control” by 
judicial and executive authorities existed, where judicial authorities oversaw 
the initial stages of extradition, and the Secretary of State for the Home 
Office made the final decision on the extradition of the sought person.61   
British extradition law prefigured EAW procedures in certain respects.  
The last British Extradition Act before the Framework Decision, the 1989 
Act, did not require EU Member States to prove a prima facie case based on 
the evidence against the sought person.62  This law, just like the EAW 
system, aimed to simplify the process and remove the delay in extradition of 
British citizens.63  However, it preserved one important procedural safeguard 
that is absent from the EAW—a right of appeal for the sought person both 
after the court proceedings and after the Secretary of State’s decision to 
complete extradition.64 
Domestic dissatisfaction with these UK extradition procedures was 
highlighted by Spain’s attempts to extradite Augusto Pinochet, which led to 
review of UK extradition procedures by the Parliament.65  Meanwhile, the 
Framework Decision, which was partially a response to growing concerns 
about terrorism in the wake of 9/11, was winding its way toward eventual 
                                                                                                                   
create “safe havens for fugitives who abuse their rights of free movement within Europe in 
order to evade justice”). 
 59 See generally Plachta, supra note 22, at 394. 
 60 See Mackarel, supra note 31, at 366 (arguing that the changes in procedural values are 
reflected in the language of the Council Framework Decision—“[g]one are the ‘requesting’ 
and ‘requested’ states . . . [t]he terms now reflect the lack of discretion built into the new 
EAW scheme where Member states are the ‘issuing’ and ‘executing’ authorities” and where 
“fugitives are no longer ‘extradited’ but under the new scheme ‘surrendered’ ”).  
 61 Martin Henley & Felicity Williams, The Application of the EAW in the UK – Legislative 
Background and Human Rights Challenges, in STILL NOT RESOLVED? CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 
OF THE EUROPEAN ARREST WARRANT 297, 297 (Elspeth Guild & Luisa Marin eds., 2009).  
 62 Id. 
 63 Id.  
 64 Id.; see also supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 65 Henley & Williams, supra note 61. 
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proclamation by the European Council.66  When the Framework Decision 
called on Member States to “take the necessary measures to comply with the 
provisions of this Framework Decision by 31 December 2003,”67 Britons 
passed legislation overhauling their extradition process.  The 2003 
Extradition Act, which came into force on January 1, 2004, was the domestic 
implementation of the Framework Decision and the EAW extradition system 
into British law.68 
The EAW system has substantially altered the extradition regime in the 
UK.  On the one hand, it has made extradition quicker and more efficient; 
before the Framework Decision, extradition took an average of eighteen 
months, but now takes an average of only fifty days.69  On the other hand, the 
EAW system has fundamentally changed relations between Britain and other 
EU nations.  In extradition, one state “request[s] cooperation from the other, 
which in turn decides to grant it or not on the grounds of non-eminently 
judicial reasons, which rather lie, in fact, in the international relations 
framework, where the principle of political opportunity plays a predominant 
role.”70  Conversely, the EAW “falls into an institutional scenario where 
judicial assistance is requested and granted within an integrated transnational 
judicial system,” and where states partially relinquish their sovereignty to 
foreign regulatory authorities.71 
III.  CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW: THE EAW REGIME IN PRACTICE 
A.  Challenges Levied by EU Member States Against the European Arrest 
Warrant 
EU Member States have not evenly accepted domestic codifications of 
the Framework Decision—an unsurprising fact, given the implications of the 
EAW for state relationships mentioned above and the EAW’s necessary 
implication that states whose citizens are sought for extradition must cede 
                                                                                                                   
 66 Id. 
 67 Council Framework Decision, supra note 3, art. 34, para. 1.  
 68 Extradition Act, 2003, c. 41. 
 69 Gilligan, supra note 2 (indicating also that extradition took only weeks in the case of 
Hussein Osman, a suspect accused of an attempted terrorist attack in London).  But see 
Gregory J. Mann, Note, The European Arrest Warrant: A Short-Lived Mechanism for 
Extradition?, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 715, 720 (2007) (stating that since the 
Framework Decision entered into force, “the average time taken to execute a warrant 
decreased from nine months to 43 days”).  
 70 Pollicino, supra note 35, at 1321. 
 71 Id. 
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some measure of judicial and territorial sovereignty to requesting Member 
States.72  Fundamentally, the EAW asks a state to cede control over one of its 
citizens to another state.  Understandably, countries are resistant to this idea 
and have nationality exceptions in their constitutions prohibiting the 
extradition of their citizens.73  There are also the practical difficulties of 
integrating the EAW system into very diverse legal frameworks across the 
EU.74  The provisions of the Framework Decision brought the domestic law 
of certain EU Member States directly into conflict with their commitment to 
create unified EU law on extraditions.75  The cases of Germany, Poland, 
Cyprus, and the Czech Republic are particularly instructive in showing how 
the innovations of the EAW caused “unavoidable ‘constitutional 
disturbance’ ” in these nations.76  Indeed, other Member States revised their 
own constitutions to avoid such constitutional disturbances.77 
The German Federal Constitutional Court struck down the German statute 
codifying the Framework Decision on the grounds that it was a violation of 
the German Basic Law because the rights afforded to German citizens sought 
under EAWs were not proportional to the protections offered to citizens 
domestically.78  Because the court was concerned that the severity of the 
                                                                                                                   
 72 See Carl Lebeck, National Constitutional Control and the Limits of European Integration 
– the European Arrest Warrant in the German Federal Constitutional Court, PUB. L., Spring 
2007, at 23, 23, 25 (noting that “[t]he point of the EAW is that judicial review of requests for 
extradition to EU Member States shall be concerned only with whether the formal 
requirements for extradition are fulfilled,” and that “[w]hether the request for extradition is 
justified is only to be tried in the court that has requested the extradition”). 
 73 See Mann, supra note 69, at 718 (arguing that nationality exceptions are grounded in “the 
sovereign authority of a State over its citizens”).  
 74 See Satzger & Pohl, supra note 5, at 689 (noting that “the practice of implementation in 
the various Member States has not been consistent,” and that “[i]ntegration-friendly 
regulations such as Germany’s are opposed with implementation laws which — such as in 
Austria — widely exhaust the grounds for non-execution of the European Arrest Warrant as 
provided by the Framework Decision”). 
 75 See Pollicino, supra note 35, at 1322 (explaining that “[a] number of Member States have 
wanted to avoid the application of such a measure to one of their own citizens,” and that 
before the Framework Decision was adopted, “thirteen of the (then) twenty-five Member 
States provided for constitutional dispositions forbidding, or, somehow, limiting the 
extradition of nationals”). 
 76 Id.    
 77 Id. at 1322–23 (noting that some EU countries like Latvia, Portugal, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia revised each of their constitutions before the constitutionality of their implementing 
acts could be challenged in their national court systems). 
 78 See Lebeck, supra note 72, at 23, 27; see also Satzger & Pohl, supra note 5, at 691–92 
(indicating that the German Federal Constitutional Court struck down the German legislation 
because of the legislature’s “insufficient consideration of the principle of proportionality,” as 
German citizens sought under EAWs were not guaranteed that their behavior would not be 
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crime for which a German citizen could be extradited did not match the 
severity of the potential punishment under the EAW, the law was struck 
down, as the German Basic Law requires “a concrete review on a case-by-
case basis . . . to ascertain that the prosecuted individual is not deprived of 
the guarantees or fundamental rights he would have been granted in 
Germany.”79   
One commentator has argued that the underlying theme of the German 
court’s “decision is a sense of ill-concealed distrust in the legal systems of 
the other Member States as to the safeguarding of the accused person.”80  
This distrust regarding the protection of individual rights in legal systems of 
other EU Member States “merges with a firm belief that the right to a 
commensurate protection from those different criminal law systems, which 
cannot protect the legal rights of a person under investigation, is the 
exclusive right of German citizens themselves.”81 
In Poland, the amendments that were added to the Polish Code of 
Criminal Procedure in order to codify the Framework Decision were struck 
down by the Polish Constitutional Tribunal for being incompatible with the 
constitutional ban on the extradition of Polish citizens.82  However, the 
Tribunal did take advantage of a constitutional mechanism that allowed it to 
delay the date on which an unconstitutional act ceased to be binding83 in 
order to allow for a transition period in which constitutional reform could 
take place without breaching EU law.84 
In Cyprus, the Supreme Court struck down the implementing statute as 
inconsistent with the nation’s constitution.85  The relevant language of the 
Cypriot Constitution provided that “no one can be deprived of their freedom 
except for those cases provided for by the law,” which Cypriot jurisprudence 
                                                                                                                   
retroactively criminalized or guaranteed the right to judicial remedy, which is true because the 
German implementing act excludes action against granting extradition). 
 79 Pollicino, supra note 35, at 1328. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at 1345; see also id. at 1347 (arguing that the German court’s opinion reflected 
distrust “of the other European legal systems’ ability to secure an adequate level of rights 
protection” and that the “sole guarantee left to the German citizen is the certainty of being, as 
far as possible, prosecuted, judged and eventually convicted by a domestic German court”). 
 82 Anthony Arnull, Arrested Development, 30 EUR. L. REV. 605, 605 (2005).  
 83 Id. at 606.  
 84 Daniel Sarmiento, European Union: The European Arrest Warrant and the Quest for 
Constitutional Coherence, 6 INT’L J. CONST. L. 171, 173 (2008). 
 85 Pollicino, supra note 35, at 1314–15. 
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interpreted to prohibit extradition of citizens of Cyprus.86  This difficulty 
could only be removed by altering the language of the constitution.87 
In the Czech Republic, the Brno Constitutional Court rejected the trend of 
striking down constitutionally faulty implementing statutes and upheld the 
Czech implementing statute.88  It is important to note that it took “strain[ing] 
the verbatim content of both the constitutional disposition and the domestic 
law under discussion” in order to harmonize the plain language of the Czech 
Constitution with the Framework Decision mandate.89  However, even the 
seemingly EU-friendly Czech Constitutional Court did not give blanket 
approval to the EAW being used against Czech citizens.90  Rather, it found 
that an EAW could violate the Czech constitution “ ‘where the standards of 
criminal proceedings [in the issuing member state] do not meet the 
requirements for criminal proceedings enshrined in the Czech constitutional 
order.’ ”91  This, in effect, gave Czech criminal courts the authority to 
evaluate the adequacy of the criminal justice systems of requesting states on 
a case-by-case basis and deny extradition of a Czech citizen to a Member 
State whose criminal justice system falls short of the Czech constitutional 
standard.92 
Other Member States have avoided challenging their implementing 
statutes at the constitutional level, but have taken steps to institute “opt-outs” 
to the demands of the Framework Decision that limit the effectiveness of 
EAWs when used against their own citizens.93  Holland will not agree to 
extradite its citizens unless they are permitted to serve their sentences in 
Dutch jails.94  Belgium does not recognize EAWs applying to abortions in 
order to protect its citizens from extradition by Member States like Malta, 
Ireland, and Poland, which criminalize abortion and “abetting abortion.”95  
                                                                                                                   
 86 Id. at 1355 n.8. 
 87 Id. (noting that the new language of the Cypriot Constitution states “the arrest of a citizen 
of the Republic aimed at surrender following the issue of an arrest warrant, is possible only 
with regard to facts and actions subsequent to Cyprus’ adhesion to the European Union”).  
 88 Id. at 1315 (noting that, perhaps unexpectedly, the Czech Constitutional Court upheld the 
implementing statute despite language in the Czech Constitution that stated “no Czech citizen 
shall be removed from his/her homeland”). 
 89 Id. at 1338. 
 90 See Sarmiento, supra note 84, at 172–73 (noting that unlike most member states, 
Germany and the Czech Republic did not accede to both double criminality exceptions in their 
legislation).  
 91 Id. at 174. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Gilligan, supra note 13.  
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. 
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France has shown reluctance to extradite its citizens pursuant to EAWs, and 
has previously stated that they will not be extradited.96  Following the 
constitutional challenge to the German implementing statute, Germany 
passed a new implementing law.97  However, German courts have since ruled 
that extradition of German citizens is proper only if it meets a 
“ ‘proportionality rule’ stating that only those accused of serious crimes can 
be seized under a warrant.”98  Greece’s implementation statute includes 
additional grounds for mandatory refusal of an EAW that are not included in 
the Framework Decision.99  Italy recognizes an “EAW provided it respects 
the fundamental rights of the supreme principles of the Italian constitutional 
order.”100 
B.  Shortcomings of the Extradition Act of 2003 and of UK Officials in 
Protecting UK Citizens 
The UK’s experience with implementing the Framework Decision has 
been different from that of the Member States noted above.  The UK statute 
provides a check on extradition, empowering the Secretary of State to use 
national security as grounds to overrule competent judicial decisions.101  This 
minimal protection seems minor in contrast to those EU Member States that 
have installed more robust opt-outs that have either allowed states not to 
honor EAWs or have challenged the constitutionality of the implementing 
legislation.  As a result, the UK has seemingly sacrificed the rights of its 
citizens for the sake of compliance with EU directives.102  Indeed, some 
critics have gone so far as to disesteem the actual text of the implementing 
legislation for adding further confusion to the extradition process.103   
                                                                                                                   
 96 Id. 
 97 Nicolas Nohlen, Germany: The European Arrest Warrant Case, 6 INT’L J. CONST. L. 153, 
154 (2008).  
 98 Gilligan, supra note 13; see also Vogel & Spencer, supra note 18, at 474, 476–77 
(discussing a recent ruling by the Higher Regional Court in Stuttgart, Germany indicating that 
German jurisprudence on extradition and proportionality imposes a test on EAWs by which a 
sentence cannot be “intolerably severe” or “by all means incommensurate” or “in no way 
justifiable” in light of all relevant aspects of the case). 
 99 Jacqueline S. Hodgson, Safeguarding Suspects’ Rights in Europe: A Comparative 
Perspective, 14 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 611, 626 (2011). 
 100 Id. 
 101 Satzger & Pohl, supra note 5, at 690.  
 102 Gilligan, supra note 13 (indicating the UK has no such opt-outs, which has led critics to 
argue that British judges apply the EAW provisions too stringently without considering the 
injustices that can result for British citizens). 
 103 See J.R. Spencer, Implementing the European Arrest Warrant: A Tale of How Not to Do 
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The criticism of UK policy is not new.  Even before the EAW provision 
became a part of UK law, British commentators were concerned about the 
potential effects of the EAW within their country.  While acknowledging that 
simplifying and reforming extradition may be a worthwhile endeavor, one 
commentator noted that it should “not be at the expense of the basic rights of 
British citizens.”104  This concern, raised in 2001, seems prescient given the 
challenges the UK currently faces.105  The former UK Home Secretary, who 
introduced the EAW, has stated that he was “right, as Home Secretary in the 
post-9/11 era, to agree to the European Arrest Warrant, but . . . was 
insufficiently sensitive to how it might be used.”106   
British law poses two structural problems for anyone seeking to challenge 
the UK EAW statute.  First, while nations like Germany or Poland have 
constitutions against which to measure the fairness of EAW procedures, 
“there is—for good or ill—no equivalent in the United Kingdom.”107  
Furthermore, even principles of EU law will not help British citizens because 
of the actions of the UK government.  The EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights protects against punishments that are disproportionate to the alleged 
crime, and can be invoked in courts throughout the EU.108  However, the UK 
extracted a concession from the Lisbon Treaty, which gives the EU Charter 
                                                                                                                   
It, 30 STATUTE L. REV. 184, 184–86, 188 (2009) (looking beyond the policy shortcomings of 
the Extradition Act to the “narrower question of the technical quality of the drafting by which 
the policy was—or was meant to be—carried out” and concluding that the implementing 
legislation is “unnecessarily complicated,” “pointlessly obtuse,” and “needlessly prolix” and 
that the legislators drafting it “have gone out of their way to distance the implementing text 
from the Framework Decision that it is supposedly designed to implement”); see also 
Mackarel, supra note 31, at 381 (explaining that “where criticism has arisen of the UK in 
respect of the EAW, it has been in relation to the legislative mismatch between the language 
and procedural requirements of the Framework Decision and the 2003 Act”). 
 104 Norman Lamont, EU Police Could Arrest You at Home and Jail You Abroad, TELEGRAPH 
(Dec. 4, 2001), www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/3570591/EU-police-could-arre 
st-you-at-home-and-jail-you-abroad.html.   
 105 See id. (noting that “the European arrest warrant takes for granted complete trust in other 
countries’ legal systems” which have problematic criminal procedures and further arguing that 
even though “it cannot be right . . . to face trial for something that Parliament has not made 
criminal” or for “the law of another country . . . [to] be applied extra-territorially in the United 
Kingdom,” the government has not appreciated that these problems arise from the EAW 
abolishing the principle of double criminality); see also Spencer, supra note 103, at 184 
(arguing that current detractors view the EAW as “a legislative sell-out which means that 
honest Englishmen, when falsely accused elsewhere of crimes they did not commit, are now 
removed, without a proper examination of the merits of the case, for trial in foreign legal 
systems which, by definition, leave much to be desired”). 
 106 Gilligan, supra note 1. 
 107 Vogel & Spencer, supra note 18, at 481.  
 108 Id.  
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of Fundamental Rights the same effect as EU treaties in the courts of 
Member States, in theory, because it did not want “a second helping of 
human rights imposed upon the UK legal system via ‘Brussels.’ ”109   
Ironically, the European skepticism that motivated this concession stands 
in the way of the UK protecting its citizens from abuses abroad.  For 
instance, UK citizens sent abroad under EAWs face a serious disadvantage 
because, as foreigners, they are regarded as flight risks who are often refused 
bail and can be kept in pretrial detention, potentially for years, even for 
minor crimes.110  
The UK’s extradition regime is widely considered an unfair burden on the 
innocent and the current Home Secretary has announced that the regime, 
including the EAW provision, is being reviewed by the British 
government.111  The Home Secretary has stated that her government will 
review the UK’s extradition agreements to make sure they are “even-
handed” and “work both efficiently and in the interests of justice.”112  Of 
particular concern will be the “breadth of Secretary of State discretion in an 
extradition case . . . the operation of the European Arrest Warrant, including 
the way in which those of its safeguards which are optional have been 
transposed into UK law,” and “whether requesting states should be required 
to provide prima facie evidence.”113  This review is expected to last until the 
end of the summer of 2011.114  
IV.  ANALYSIS: FIXING THE EAW REGIME IN THE UK 
At the core of these challenges to the EAW system and the 
implementation of the Framework Decision is the inadequacy of full mutual 
recognition by EU Member States of judicial decisions in criminal matters.  
Mutual recognition implies transposing some degree of foreign legal 
elements into the domestic criminal justice arena.  While mutual recognition 
of judicial decisions in the EU exists already for civil judgments and arbitral 
awards, the extension of this principle to criminal law is far more difficult.115  
                                                                                                                   
 109 Id.  
 110 Gilligan, supra note 13. 
 111 Reviewing Extradition: Hand ‘Em Over, ECONOMIST, Sept. 25, 2010, at 69. 
 112 Written Statement to Parliament from Theresa May, UK Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, 
Written Statement on Extradition Review (Sept. 8, 2010), available at https://www.gov.uk/gover  
nment/speeches/theresa-may-written-statement-on-extradition-review. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Ilias Bantekas, The Principle of Mutual Recognition in EU Criminal Law, 32 EUR. L. 
REV. 365, 365 (2007) (“Unlike foreign civil judgments and arbitral awards where only minor 
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Despite the “Europeanization of the penal law” that the EAW system has 
supposedly brought about, the EU has “rejected the notion of procedural 
criminal law harmonisation and unification ideology by proclaiming that the 
aim of the Member States was not: ‘to create a common territory where 
uniform detection and investigation procedures would be applicable to all 
law enforcement agencies in Europe in the handling of security matters.’ ”116 
It is precisely this lack of harmonization that leaves British citizens open 
to rights abuses at the hands of other EU Member States.  As the challenges 
to the EAW noted above demonstrate, EU Member States do not feel the 
requisite trust in the legal systems of fellow Member States to ensure the 
system works well.117  Absent reform in the domestic criminal systems of EU 
Member States that bring all EU nations to an acceptable minimum level of 
defendants’ rights protections, the distrust demonstrated by the nations 
discussed above will continue.118  The EU itself has recently acknowledged 
                                                                                                                   
modifications are required in the civil procedural law of the executing state, the mutual 
recognition of foreign criminal decisions necessitates fundamental changes to the criminal 
procedure law of both the issuing and executing state in order to accommodate differences in 
gathering/admissibility of evidence, procedural rights and guarantees (such as right to counsel 
and legal aid, trials in absentia and others), as well as the enforcement of criminal sanctions 
that will vary from country to country.”); see also Mackarel, supra note 31, at 362 (“The 
EAW represented a fundamental change to the nature of extradition standards and procedure 
in the European Union (EU) and was the first manifestation of the policy to make mutual 
recognition the basis of measures to develop cooperation throughout the EU in criminal law 
and criminal procedure.”). 
 116 Bantekas, supra note 115, at 367–68.  
 117 Id. at 374 (“The problem, however, remains that even so, mutual recognition has not 
overridden trust concerns that relate to the detention facilities and efficiency of the legal 
systems of other EU Member States.”); see also Plachta, supra note 22, at 394 (arguing that 
“[m]utual recognition can only operate effectively in a spirit of confidence, whereby not only 
judicial authorities, but all actors in the criminal process see decisions of the judicial 
authorities of other Member States as equivalent to their own, implying not only trust in the 
adequacy of one’s partners’ rules, but also trust that those rules are correctly applied”). 
 118 See Plachta, supra note 22 (quoting the EU commission tasked with preparing the 
implementation of mutual recognition of judicial decisions in criminal matters, even before 
the Council Framework Decision was passed, which indicated that “mutual recognition is very 
much dependent on a number of parameters which determine its effectiveness” among which 
are “mechanisms for safeguarding the rights of suspects” and the “definition of common 
minimum standards necessary to facilitate the application of the principle of mutual 
recognition” and that “it must . . . be ensured that the treatment of suspects and the rights of 
the defense would not only not suffer from the implementation of the principle [of mutual 
recognition] but that the safeguards would even be improved through the process” but that a 
comprehensive proposal regarding defendants’ rights set forth by this commission was not 
adopted by the European Council, which promulgated the Framework Decision). 
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that “not enough ha[s] been done at the European level to safeguard 
fundamental rights of individuals in criminal proceedings.”119 
A.  A Potential Solution and Why It May Succeed 
UK citizens remain unprotected from subpar criminal justice systems that 
currently exist in the EU.120  The solution this Note proposes is to add an 
American-style due process provision to the UK’s EAW regime to be 
considered by judges when deciding whether to surrender UK citizens under 
EAWs.  Such a due process provision would not simply transpose elements 
of the U.S. Constitution and associated case law into the British system of 
law.  If the implementation of the EAW system across the EU has made 
anything clear, it is that transposing new procedures into already existing 
systems of criminal justice poses significant difficulties.  Rather, this 
provision would consist of several factors discussed below that are inspired 
by U.S. Supreme Court rulings on due process.  The provision is limited in 
scope and addresses the most common problems faced by UK citizens sought 
under EAWs.  UK judges would weigh these factors in determining whether 
to honor EAWs submitted by other Member States.  If, in light of these 
factors, UK judges are satisfied that Britons will be treated fairly by the 
foreign judicial system, the EAW will be honored and UK citizens may be 
extradited.  An inquiry by British judges into individual EAW cases will help 
protect UK citizens.121 
In the short-term, such a due process component would prevent UK 
citizens from being extradited to those EU states that do not adequately 
protect defendants’ rights.  As a residual, long-term effect, it may push those 
Member States that are denied their EAW requests, and thus denied their 
                                                                                                                   
 119 Id. (describing a November 30, 2009 Justice Council Roadmap for strengthening 
procedural rights which recognized this shortcoming). 
 120 See, e.g., id. (giving one example of inconsistent defendants’ rights—meaning 
information is provided to defendants and how that information is presented—across the EU 
by noting that even though all EU states have signed on to provide fair trial rights according to 
the European Convention on Human Rights, in some EU states suspects only receive oral 
information about their procedural rights, while in others they receive technically complex 
written information only if they demand it); see also id. (“[A] suspect will be told of his/her 
right to interpretation orally in Belgium, in writing in Hungary and through a Letter of Rights 
in Germany.  Fifteen countries only tell suspects about their right to remain silent orally.  
Some EU countries provide a comprehensive warning in writing but only provide oral 
translations of it to people who cannot understand the language.”). 
 121 See Hodgson, supra note 99, at 626 (“In assuming a level playing field and refusing to 
enquire into individual cases, in practice, mutual recognition tolerates different human rights 
standards.”).  
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ability to prosecute individuals they suspect of crimes committed within their 
borders, to make changes in their criminal justice systems that will bring 
them in line with appropriate levels of defendants’ rights.  Alternatively, it 
may push these states to support efforts at the European level to protect 
defendants’ rights. 
Several factors argue for the potential success of such a due process 
scheme.  First, because the EAW system was implemented through a Council 
Framework Decision rather than a regulation, EU Member States are free to 
choose the best “form and methods” to reach the objectives set forth by the 
EU.122  The EAW system is not a rigid, perfectly uniform system that is 
directly binding on Member States.  Variance in the content of statutes 
implementing the EAW system is tolerated, and states are only required to 
achieve the result sought by the Framework Decision.123  Second, as 
demonstrated by the court rulings in Germany, Poland, and Cyprus that 
declared implementing statutes unconstitutional, there is precedent for 
challenging the contents of the Framework Decision and the EAW system it 
intended to create.124  Third, there is also precedent for giving judges in 
executing states the power to deny extradition to Member States that do not 
offer sufficient protections for defendants.  As noted above, the Czech court 
has retained authority to determine the adequacy of the criminal justice 
systems of requesting states and deny extradition of a Czech citizen.  The 
German court has also ruled that judges are required to ascertain that a 
German citizen sought under an EAW is not deprived of the guarantees or 
fundamental rights he would have been granted in Germany.  Fourth, the opt-
outs practiced by several Member States indicate that domestic law carving 
out exceptions to the mandatory extradition required by the Framework 
Decision are common practice and tolerated by the EU.  Finally, the UK 
government’s ongoing review of its extradition scheme provides the perfect 
opportunity to implement the needed protections for UK citizens sought 
under EAWs. 
                                                                                                                   
 122 See Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 249, 
Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 3 (“A regulation shall have general application.  It shall be 
binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.  A directive shall be 
binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but 
shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods.”). 
 123 Id.  
 124 See, e.g., Angelika Nußberger, Poland: The Constitutional Tribunal on the 
Implementation of the European Arrest Warrant, 6 INT’L J. CONST. L. 162 (2008) (discussing 
the Polish constitutional approach to implementation).  
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B.  The Contents of the Due Process Provision 
The ultimate aim of the proposed due process provision is to ensure a fair 
trial for Britons abroad.  Access to evidence and the right to a speedy trial are 
American ideas aimed at ensuring fair proceedings.  These same rights 
would make up the contents of the due process provision, as they address the 
most pressing problems facing UK citizens extradited abroad under EAWs.  
Other due process rights would certainly be relevant and could be added as 
factors for British judges to consider.  However, there are a number of 
reasons for the due process provision to be modest in scope.  First, the opt-
outs practiced by other Member States that serve as models for this provision 
are themselves rather limited (i.e., they are not blanket refusals to honor any 
and all EAWs).  Second, and most importantly, a more expansive set of 
factors may cause the UK to violate of the Framework Decision by violating 
the objective sought to be achieved by the Framework Decision. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that “suppression by the prosecution of 
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where 
the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the 
good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”125  The Court indicated that this 
rule was “not punishment of society for misdeeds of a prosecutor but 
avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused” and that “[s]ociety wins not only 
when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair.”126 
When viewed in light of this due process requirement, the very core of the 
EAW system seems to be the suppression of evidence for the purposes of 
accelerating the extradition process between Member States.  There is no 
provision in the Framework Decision that allows a defendant to view 
evidence brought against him before he is extradited by his home nation, nor 
is there any requirement that the state seeking extradition under an EAW 
provide any substantive evidentiary basis to the judicial authorities in the 
state charged with executing their EAW.  Rather, the Framework Decision 
requires that the state seeking extradition merely provide “a description of 
the circumstances in which the offence was committed, including the time, 
place[,] and degree of participation in the offence by the requested 
person.”127 
                                                                                                                   
 125 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).  
 126 Id. at 87–88 (further noting that “[a] prosecution that withholds evidence on demand of 
an accused which, if made available, would tend to exculpate him or reduce the penalty helps 
shape a trial that bears heavily on the defendant” and “casts the prosecutor in the role of an 
architect of a proceeding that does not comport with standards of justice”). 
 127 Council Framework Decision, supra note 3, art. 8, para. 1(e). 
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Under the EAW system as currently constituted, it is not the place of the 
British courts to analyze the sufficiency of the evidence used to deprive a 
British citizen of his or her liberty in a foreign state.  In a sense, judges are 
asked to take on faith that the requesting state has sufficient evidence to try 
the UK citizen it seeks.  They are asked to assume that the information 
provided by the requesting state is correct and to turn over the UK citizen.   
This faith would be justified were it not for the accounts of extradited UK 
citizens jailed abroad who have never been permitted to see the evidence 
against them or to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence that was the 
basis for their arrest.128  In the words of the Court in Brady, where the 
requesting state fails to provide the evidence to a UK citizen, that state fails 
to “comport with standards of justice” and treats the accused unfairly, such 
that the “system of the administration of justice suffers.”129  Under this 
proposal, UK judges are tasked with weighing whether the evidence 
provided to them under the EAW request is sufficient for a fair trial and thus 
justifies extradition. 
A further right guaranteed to defendants in the U.S. criminal justice 
system is the right to a speedy trial.  The Constitution provides, in relevant 
part, that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy . . . trial.”130  This right attaches when the defendant in some way 
becomes the “accused,” as where the government initiates a criminal 
prosecution through indictment, information, formal charges, or by arresting 
and holding him to answer for a criminal charge.131   
Under a U.S. due process analysis, the right to a speedy trial would attach 
either when the requesting state sends an EAW request to be executed by UK 
officials or when UK officers arrest a suspect on the basis of an EAW sent to 
them by a fellow Member State.  Thus, under this proposal UK judges are 
tasked with determining whether the requesting state is likely to grant the 
British suspect a speedy trial.  In making this determination, UK judges can 
look to the requesting state’s reputation, past practices—including the 
requesting state’s case law—and any other relevant evidence that may touch 
on the likelihood that this right will be respected. 
The right to a speedy trial serves several interests.  It aims at minimizing 
“the possibility of lengthy incarceration prior to trial [and] to reduce the 
lesser, but nevertheless substantial, impairment of liberty imposed on an 
                                                                                                                   
 128 See Gilligan, supra note 1 (providing individual accounts and statistics on no-evidence 
traditions resulting from EAWs). 
 129 Brady, 373 U.S. at 87–88. 
 130 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 131 United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313, 320 (1971). 
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accused while released on bail.”132  It also aims “to minimize anxiety and 
concern accompanying public accusation.”133  Finally, it is meant “to limit 
the possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of [the] accused to 
defend himself.”134 
The case of Andrew Symeou illustrates just how harmful the lack of a 
speedy trial under the EAW can be.  Mr. Symeou was arrested under an 
EAW sent to the UK by Greece in connection with a nightclub murder.135  
There were some serious contradictions in the evidence against Mr. Symeou 
and some alarming irregularities in the way the police investigated the 
incident.136  Despite weak evidence, Mr. Symeou spent nearly a year in jail 
before being released on bail; almost three years after the victim’s death no 
trial date has been set.137  The terms of his bail do not allow him to leave 
Greece, and this has caused his parents to move to Athens to support him.138 
The interests that the right to speedy trial aims to protect, which were 
noted above, are all implicated in Mr. Symeou’s case.  Without a speedy trial 
requirement, there is nothing to minimize the possibility that Mr. Symeou’s 
incarceration prior to trial will be unnecessarily lengthy.  While on bail, his 
liberty is severely impaired by since is restricted to Greece and prevented 
from going home to the UK.  The “anxiety and concern” felt by his parents 
in response to his public accusation for a murderer are evident throughout 
their account.  Finally, the delay of Greek officials in bringing this case to 
trial has limited Mr. Symeou’s ability to defend himself.  With each passing 
day the recollection of witnesses supporting Mr. Symeou’s case fades.  
Witnesses may die or may no longer be found when the trial finally starts.  
Perhaps worst of all, evidence present at the scene of the victim’s death, 
deteriorates. 
                                                                                                                   
 132 United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 8 (1982). 
 133 United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966). 
 134 Id. 
 135 Andrew Gilligan, Extradition Nightmare: ‘When We First Saw Our Son in Jail It Broke 
Our Hearts,’ TELEGRAPH (Aug. 21, 2010), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-or 
der/7958213/Extradition-nightmare-When-we-first-saw-our-son-in-jail-it-broke-our-hearts.html. 
 136 Id. (explaining that witnesses interviewed by Greek police, who have since recanted their 
testimonies, used “precisely the same, rather stilted words” in their statements despite the fact 
that their statements were supposedly taken at different times on different days and also that 
police showed witnesses a photo of a group of people, on which Andrew was circled with the 
word “perpetrator” written in Greek). 
 137 Id. 
 138  Id. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
The use of EAWs against UK citizens has escalated since the 
implementation of the Council Framework Decision in 2004.  This pattern is 
particularly alarming given the overuse and disproportionate use by the other 
EU Member States.  More alarming than this is the lack of protection for 
defendants extradited from the UK to other Member States.  While other EU 
states have challenged the implementation of the Council Framework 
Decision or have instituted opt-outs to protect their citizens, the UK has been 
left behind.  This Note analyzed those abuses in light of U.S. due process 
rights and proposes a due process provision composed of those rights.  This 
provision would give the UK grounds to decline extradition of any UK 
citizen where it is reasonable to expect that these rights owed to the 
defendant will not be respected by the requesting state. 
